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JOINT VENTURE OR PARTNERSHIP
In a recent case' decided in a lower court in New York the following defi-
nition was adopted: "A joint venture is a limited partnership. 12 This state-
ment again calls to mind the conflict and uncertainty of thought," the strained
comparisons 4 and general confusion5 which have resulted when jurists have
attempted categorically to pigeon-hole the joint adventure in the same orifice
with the partnership. It is not the purpose of this paper to show that the two
relationships are generically dissimilar. However, it should be recognized that
they are separate concepts, serving separate ends and susceptible of independent
interpretation in the law.0
History and Origin
The concept of joint adventure is relatively new in the law. The first recorded
American joint venture cases 7 were decided in the early part of the nine-
teenth century. The concept had never really been recognized 'in the English
law.8 The relationship has been defined as an association of two or more persons
1. La Dreire v. Martin, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 436, 437 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
2. This truncated definition was quoted from the earlier case of Ross v. Willett, 76 Hun
211, 213, 27 N. Y. Supp. 785, 786 (Sup. Ct. 1894) ; see note 4 infra.
3. ROWLEY, MODERN LAW or PARTNERSHIP § 1001 (1916). "Joint adventures are unlike
limited partnerships, since those who join in them are partners therein and their liability
as to third persons is equal and unlimited, but in some jurisdictions the courts have not
nicely distinguished between joint adventures, special partnerships and limited partnerships,
for in New York the court has held that where two persons agree to the purchase and sale
of goods on a joint account, each sharing in the profits and losses, it is a joint adventure
or limited partnership. There is a tendency of the courts to hold that . . .joint adventures
are not strictly to be regarded as partnerships. ... .
4. "A joint adventure is a limited partnership, not limited in a statutory sense as to
liability, but as to its scope and duration .... " Ross v. Willett, 76 Hun 211, 213, 27 N,
Y. Supp. 785, 786 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
5. "The court is confronted in the instant case with an agreement that does not fit
into one of the established pigeon-holes. Concerned with mining operations, the trans-
action contains debtor-creditor elements, evidences some characteristics of a prospecting
or grubstake contract and yet includes provisions, especially as to the test formula, which
might be elements of a full-fledged partnership. Emphasizing the partnership apects, the
court imposes upon the Syndicate a liability for necessary expenses by resorting to the con-
cept of the joint venture." 42 CoL. L. REv. 142, 143 (1942).
6. "In decisions, digests, texts, and other collections of legal literature there are classifica-
tions of associations in which joint adventure is accorded a niche of its own, like corpora-
tions, partnerships, etc., and the natural inference from this procedure is that we are
setting up a body of new law for the administration of joint adventures." Mechem, Tile
Law of Joint Adventures, 15 MINN. L. REv. 644 (1931).
7. Lyles v. Styles, 15 Fed. Cas. 1143, No. 8,625 (C. C. D. Pa. 1808); Hourqueble v.
Girard, 12 Fed. Cas. 593, No. 6,732 (C. C. D. Pa. 1808).
8. Mechem. supra note 6, at 644; Bond v. O'Donnell, 205 Iowa 902, 218 N. W. 898
(1928); J. E. Tusant & Son Co. v. Chas. Weitz Sons, 195 Iowa 1386, 191 N. W. 884 (1923) ;
State ex rel. Crane Co. v. Stokke, 65 S. D. 207, 272 N. W. 811 (1937). See Note, The Dis-
tinction Between a Partnership and a Joint Adventure, 58 U. OF PA. L. REV. 309 (1910).
to carry out a single business enterprise for profit; 9 a venture jointly entered
into in pursuance of a single transaction, looking no further than its consumma-
tion and not partaking of the idea of continuity. The desire of the courts and
the legal profession to divorce a simple, single commercial venture from the
comparatively aged tentacles of partnership law, has furnished the common sense
and economic impetus behind the joint venture's rise to prominence; 10 yet there
is no reason why, for the most part, problems arising from such a relationship
cannot be settled by the ordinary principles of the law of contracts. 11
The partnership is one of the older concepts in the law, if not the oldest.
Mr. Rowley, America's leading authority on partnership law, lyrically an-
nounces that "The first man and the first woman, thrown together among
primeval conditions ... typify the earliest form of partnership."12 The partner-
ship was extensively used by the Babylonians, Ancient Jews, Romans and
Chinese.' 3 In England the earliest recorded cases are found in the seventeenth
century where there was a constant growth in partnership law as a distinct
branch of the law until 1890 when the English Partnership Act14 was passed.
The American Uniform Act, drafted by Professor William Draper Lewis and
adopted by the conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in Octo-
ber, 1914, has been enacted into law by twenty-five of the State legislatures.'0
This law does not purport to be a complete codification in every respect of the
common law relating to partnership;' 6 it is stated that in any instance not cov-
ered in the Act, the rules of law and equity, including the law merchant, shall
govern.' 7 While the Uniform Partnership Law may not he perfect, on the whole
it constitutes a definite advance. The advantages gained from it are a certain
amount of definiteness and certainty in the statement of the rules of partner-
ship, especially in respect to the problems pertaining to partnership property,
9. RowLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 975. Ross v. Burrage, 233 Mass. 439, 448, 124 N. E.
267, 271 (1919).
10. Mechem, supra note 6, at 658.
11. Note, 33 HEARv. L. REv. 852, 854 (1920).
12. RowLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1. The author avoids, however, any reference to
the story of Adam and Eve or its modern ramifications on dissolution.
13. Id. op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 2-5.
14. 53 & 54 VicT., c. 39.
15. Alaska, May 3, 1917; Arkansas, March 26, 1941; California, August 14, 1929;
Colorado, April 17, 1931; Idaho, January 1, 1920; Illinois, July 1, 1917; Maryland, June 1,
1916; Massachusetts, Jan. 1, 1923; Michigan, April 17, 1917; Minnesota, June 1, 1921;
Nebraska, May 25, 1943; Nevada, July 1, 1931; New Jersey, April 15, 1919; New York,
Oct. 1, 1919; North Carolina, March 15, 1941; Oregon, March 31, 1939; Pennsylvania, July
1, 1915; South Dakota, March 12, 1923; Tennessee, July 1, 1917; Utah, May 10, 1921;
Vermont, March 31, 1941; Virginia, July 1, 1918; Washington, March 15, 1945; Wisconsin,
July 6, 1915; Wyoming, February 20, 1917. 7 U. L. A. (194S Cum. Annual Supp.) 6.
16. For instance, the Act makes no mention of the Statute of Frauds nor does it make
provision for the fraudulent transfers of partnership property. The latter subject is, how-
ever, covered to some extent in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, especially 9 U.
L. A. § 8.
17. 7 U.L.A. § 5.
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and uniformity of that law in the jurisdictions enacting the Act. In view of the
fixed and definite place which the partnership has gained in the life of business
and in the law, it would seem preferable that it be not hampered by the in-
clusion of certain "fringe" relationships, such as that of the joint venture.
Partnerships at Common Law
Since it is believed that the main distinction between the joint adventure and
the partnership is to be found in the essential nature of the enterprise into
which the parties intend to enter, it is imperative for the purpose of this com-
ment to overlook many of the less important and accidental features of the
two concepts which concededly are similar.
At common law there were many single commercial transactions construed
by courts as partnerships for the simple reason that the joint venture as a
distinct commercial vehicle had not yet been recognized. There was no other
category at hand into which to fit the relationship now known as the joint
venture. Today these same ventures would not be so treated. They more
properly come within the purview of the newly recognized concept of the joint
venture, a concept which partakes as much of the law of ordinary contracts as
it does of partnership law. A few of these cases are here included to illus-
trate the above statements. A joint purchase with a view to a joint sale and a
communion of profit and loss, though for a single transaction, was held to con-
stitute a partnership.' 8 Persons who owned merchandise in common and who
in a single consignment shipped it on joint account and risk for sale, were
held to be co-partners in that adventure.' 9 Two persons who agreed to pay
equally for a tract of land, to sell it and then divide the profits equally were held
to be partners in the speculation. 20 There are many more cases similar to the
above2 1 which indicate that the common law conception of partnership was
applied too loosely to many forms of simple commercial ventures which today
would undoubtedly be construed as joint adventures. 22 As the law progresses
and evolves the courts are making further use of this simple concept and are
avoiding unnecessary reference to the more cumbersome and sometimes unsuit-
able tenets of partnership law. Prior to the recognition and acceptance of the
18. In re Warren, 29 Fed. Gas. 266, No. 17,191 (D. C. D. Me. 1847). Cf. Hoare v.
Dawes, 1 Douglas 371 (K. B. 1780).
19. 260 Hogsheads of Molasses, 24 Fed. Cas. 445, No. 14,296 (D. C. D. Me. 1866).
20. Canada v. Barksdale, 76 Va. 899 (1881).
21. A few of such cases are Soul6 v. Hayward, 1 Cal. 345 (1850); Hagan v. Fowler, 6
La. 311 (1834); Guibert v. Saunders & Whiteman, 10 N. Y. St. Rep. 43 (1887); Heirs of
Ludlow v. Cooper's Devisees, 4 Ohio St. 1 (1854).
22. In the following situations the parties thereto were held to be joint adventurers:
where two persons were to share the expenses of reconditioning realty and then to share
resulting profits upon a 40-60% basis for the first five years and equally thereafter, Meln-
hard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1928) ; where participants in a stock
syndicate subscribed equal amounts of money for the purchase of capital stock of a bank
and were to share profits and losses pro rata, Brown v. Bedell, 263 N. Y. 177, 188 N. E. 641
(1934) ; where two persons purchased a bull for joint use and later sale with equal division
of profit, Walls v. Gribble, 168 Ore. 542, 124 P. (2d) 713 (1942).
(Vol. 18
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concept of joint adventure in the law, there was deemed to be an absolute
necessity to apply partnership rules to those simple commercial transactions
which are so much a part of every-day business life. The courts overexpanded
the law of partnership by applying it to cases which today would be decided
differently. The height of this period was reached when the mere receipt of
a share of the profits of a venture became the test of the existence of a partner-
ship.23 Later the English courts,2 4 realizing their error, took the more realistic
view that the real intention of the parties controls? 5 This test has been codified
today in the statutes which have crystalized the later common law of England? 5
A -trend has been shown which the text writers27 admit is narrowing down the
influence of partnership law and giving recognition to the existence of business
relationships which do not require thi application of the law of partnerships.
Partnership under the Uniform Act
The Uniform Partnership Act defines a partnership as " . ..an association
of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.)as This
is not a new definition but it does emphasize one of the main elements of a
partnership, i.e., the conduct of a "business." An inquiry into the meaning of
23. Waugh v. Carver, 2 H. Bl. 235, 126 Eng. Rep. 525 (1793); Grace v. Smith, 2 W.
Bl. 998, 96 Eng. Rep. 587 (1775).
24. Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. Cas. 26S, 11 Eng Rep. 431 (1860); Badeley v. Consolidated
Bank [18881 38 Ch. D. 238. To a great extent the same result was reached in this
country. Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611 (1892); Beecher v. Bush, 45 Mich. 188, 7
N. W. 785 (1881); Eastman v. Clark, 53 N. H. 276 (1873). In some few states, however,
including the commercially important one of New York, the unrealistic doctrine of Waugh
v. Carver survived until the adoption of legislation such as the Uniform Act, Leggett v.
Hyde, 58 N. Y. 272 (1874) ; Weasels v. Weiss, 166 Pa. St. 490, 31 At. 247 (1895).
25. "It is nevertheless possible for parties to intend no partnership and yet to form one.
If they agree upon an agreement which is a partnership in fact, it is of no importance that
they call it something else; or that they even expressly declare that they are not to be
partners. The law must declare what is the legal import of their agreements, and names
go for nothing when the substance of the arrangement shows them to be inapplicable.
But every doubtful case must be solved in favor of their intent; otherwise we should
'carry the doctrine of constructive partnership so far as to render it a trap to the unwary.'
Kent, C.J. in Post v. Kimberly, 9 John 470, 504." Cooley, J., in Beecher v. Bush, 45
Mich. 188, 193, 7 N.W. 785, 786 (1881) ; see Bolles, The Growth of Intention as a Rule o]
Law, 32 YAlE L. J. 535 (1923).
26. 7 U. L. A. § 7 (1) "persons who are not partners as to each other are not partners
as to third persons."
27. Mechem, supra note 6.
28. 7 U. L. A. § 6 (1) The Act does not purport to apply the entity theory to a part-
nership. See C~ne, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Criticism, 28 Hrm. L. Rxv. 762
(1915) ; Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HAnv.
L. REv. 158, 291 (1915) ; Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act and Legal Persons, 29 H nv.
L. P.v. 838 (1916). At times, however, the partnership is treated as though it were an
entity distinct from the members, e.g., § 8 of the Uniform Partnership Act, 7 U. L. A. § 8,
dealing with partnership property and § 8 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
9 U. L. A. § 8.
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this term leads us to the conclusion that the drafters of the Act had both con-
tinuity and extension of business activity in mind rather than the performance
of an individual commercial transaction. Section 2 of the Uniform Act defines
"Business" as "every trade, occupation or profession." These terms are ac-
cepted as referring to commercial and professional pursuits which people enter
into to sustain themselves in society. A man's trade, occupation or profession
is usually the fountainhead of his livelihood, that to which he devotes himself
over a long period of time to gain proficiency and commercial or professional
recognition and consequent monetary and social benefits. It is not generally
considered as referring to an isolated commercial or professional venture even
though that venture may be of some manitude.29 The development of restric-
tive thinking in the application of partnership law is indicated in the provisions
of the Uniform Act; its provisions are not intended to apply indiscriminately to
all commercial transactions, but only to those which can properly be said to
fall within the limits of the definition as expressed by the word "business."
It is true that the text writers"° and reported decisions3' indicate that there
may be a partnership formed for a single transaction. This appears to be a rem-
nant of the trend of thought which has held over from the outmoded view of
a partnership, referred to above. Many of these "single transactions" are
either lengthy or involved and may more properly be said to constitute a busi-
ness because of their continuing and extensive nature. Rather inconsistently the
very same text writers state that a partnership is usually formed for transacting
a general business of a particular kind. 32 The true distinction would appear
to be that, while a partnership is organized by persons intending to devote all
their efforts to the carrying on of a more or less permanent and general trade,
business or profession, a joint venture, in the commercial sense and in present
day accepted legal terminology, is expressed by the desire of two or more
people, needing some of each other's capabilities or assets for a limited period
of time and effort, to unite the effect of their individual efforts or capital in a
single enterprise for divisable profit, without anything more.
Factual Elements of a Joint Venture
The favorite distinction relied upon by the courts is that a partnership is
formed for the transaction of a general business of a particular kind while a
29. "'Carrying on' a business is a well defined term and means the conduci of a business
for a sustained period for the purposes of livelihood or profit and not merely the carrying
on of some single transaction." Walker Co. v. Burgess, 153 Va. 779, 787, 151 S. E. 165,
167 (1930).
30. ROWLEY, MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSImP § 168 (1916); MECHEM, ELEAMTS OF
PARTNERSmP § 43 (2d. ed. 1920). 0
31. Westcott v. Gilman, 170 Cal. 562, 150 Pac. 777 (1915); Kopka v. Yookey, 76 Ind.
App. 218, 131 N. E. 828 (1921) ; see Willis v. Crawford, 38 Ore. 522, 529, 63 Pac. 985, 988
(1901).
32. ROWLEY, MODERN LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 168 (1916); MECIEM, ELEMENTS OF PART-
NERSHIP § 43 (2d ed. 1920) ; see McKee v. Capitol Dairies, 164 Ore. 1, 99 P. 2d 1013
(1940).
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joint adventure relates to a single transaction of a particular kind.m The single
transaction is the venture, the completion of which may sometimes take years
and may involve innumerable ramifications. However, at the time the agree-
ment is entered into the parties in most cases can predict the scope and termina-
tion of the venture, since it is fairly restricted in its object. It is agreed that the
relationship will terminate having served its purpose. It is an agreement upon
a relationship the end and extent of which is usually foreseen at the time it is
entered into. Another distinction, which may be said to be basic, is that part-
ners are usually understood to devote their entire time and effort to the business
of the partnership. As previously pointed out it is their livelihood. In the usual
joint venture case, the adventurers generally have their own separate and dis-
tinct business or professional interests and merely join together to carry out
a particular and independent commercial or professional activity. There is,
therefore, lacking that universal community of interests and grant of complete
confidence which is to be found in the partnership and which is, in fact, its
keystone.
However, judicial vacillation in the interchangeable application of the joint
venture and partnership concepts has led to much confusion and uncertainty
in the law. In a great many instances, where the same result will flow from the
application of either concept, the courts have stated that it does not matter
what name is applied-since the results will be the same, the concepts are the
same, or the same rules should apply.3 4 Such an approach may, however, mislead
the legal profession and the courts (not to speak of the parties themselves)
when the case arises where it becomes important legally to discriminate be-
tween the two relationships. The inertia of the courts, which results in the oft-
repeated designation of certain joint ventures as partnerships, has hampered the
development of those independent principles which should come under the
heading of that particular branch of the law of contracts dealing with the joint
venture. When it becomes necessary to discriminate and apply those principles,
the law profession is often faced with a fait accompli. A particular joint venture
has been so often designated as a partnership that it is readily accepted as
such; another instance of the phenomenon that if one calls a thing by an in-
correct name often enough it will be accepted for that which it is not.
The partnership and the joint venture are separate concepts, having separate
beginnings, serving separate ends but with certain similarities in result. Re-
cently, situations have arisen which were perfectly suited for the joint adven-
ture. During the recent war the country was called upon to construct many
huge and sprawling military and naval cantonments, factories and bases. As
individual projects, involving not only tremendous size but complicated and
varied problems of construction and engineering, they were usually beyond the
relatively limited physical and financial capacity and specialized experience of
even our largest construction and engineering organizations. In the interests
33. Walls v. Gribble, 168 Ore. 542, 124 P. 2d 713 (1942).
34. Reece v. Rhoades, 25 Wyo. 91, 107, 165 Pac. 449, 453 (1917), "and it would be im-
material that the court called it a partnership, for a joint adventure partakes of the
nature of a partnership and is governed substantially by the same rules of law. "
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of speed and efficiency several of these contractors would unite their interests
for the purpose of handling one of these contracts. It was an agreement to pur-
sue one venture, one project. There was not the slightest desire on the part of
the joint contractors to make this relationship any more intimate or compre-
hensive or to have it last any longer than was necessary. The parties could fairly
predict the termination of their relationship, if not in point of time then in
point of event, and could safely set a limit upon the scope of their united efforts.
Furthermore they did not desire to merge their business or financial affairs any
more than was necessary for the completion of the project to which they were
then jointly addressing themselves. In many instances they were actually busi-
ness competitors joined together temporarily by the exigencies of the times. The
joint adventure as it has become known fitted such a situation ideally. It is
neither involved nor restricting. It requires of the parties only such joint
activity as is necessary for the venture. It is not burdened with the undesired
fetters of permanency or legal formality. It is not that it is a loose relationship
legally-for it is a true contractual relationship-but rather that it is a rela-
tively simple one, of known purpose, limited scope, the culmination of which is
not only foreseeable but generally foreseen. The parties do not intend nor de-
sire to become bound to each other anymore than is necessary for the success-
ful pursuit of the transaction In question consistent with the equal protection
of their individual rights and respective interests.
Let us examine certain of the situations which in the more recent past have
been adjudicated joint adventures.
In Elington v. World Amusement Service3 5 the parties agreed to promote and
conduct automobile races, one to furnish the grounds and track and procure
the sanction of the International Association, the other to furnish the racing
cars and drivers. Each was to take part in advertising the races, bear specified
portions of the incidental expenses and share equally in the gate and other
receipts. The joint adventure would appear to be tailor-made for such a
situation. It could hardly be imagined that they desired to enter into a
partnership. Automobile races might well enter from twenty-five to fifty of such
contracts a year in one week stands at county parks. The county fair ground
owner makes similiar agreements with trotting or horse racing associiations,
semi-professional baseball and football clubs and county fair organizations. They
are commercial infatuations rather than marriages, the offspring of the carpe
diem attitude of the commercial world. Many times the possessor of a particu-
lar commodity who lacks capital will unite with a man of wealth to facilitate
the marketing of his product. Such an arrangement is usually restricted to a
particular stock of items rather than to articles of undetermined kind or
amount. If the arrangement were of the latter type, it might look more to the
conduct of a general business rather than a limited transaction and would fall
35. 175 Minn. 563, 222 N. W. 335 (1928). But cf. McDaniel v. State Fair, 286 S. W.
513 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) where a contrary result was reached because the parties were
not jointly interested in providing the expenses of the entertainment and were to share in
the gross receipts. See § 7 (3) of the Uniform Partnership Act, 7 U. L. A. § 7 (3), which
provides: "The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership. .... .
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more properly within the realm of a partnership. In the case of In re Asiatic
Exploration, Inc.36 one party advanced money to his co-adventurer who was to
make one motion picture in Siam. The financier's sole contribution to the
venture consisted of the financial advances. The skill of the cameraman was
the contribution of the other party. The court held this arrangement to be a
joint adventure. Among other illustrative cases is Peardon v. White3 7 where
adjacent land owners, individually engaged in the dry fruit business, agreed to
construct a fruit drier for joint ownership and use, the cost to be equally di-
vided and the operating expenses to be apportioned in accordance to the
number of tons of fruit each fruit grower dried. They were held to be joint
adventurers. In Losch v. Marcinas an agreement to write a play was held to
result in a joint adventure. Attorneys who jointly undertook to handle a par-
ticular case were held to be joint adventurers 0 as were those who combined to
exercise an option.40 In Tusant v. Weitz41 a group of contractors united to
build a large installation, the builders were brought together by one man, who
obtained and signed the contract, supervised the work and hired and fired
workers at will. It was determined that this was an employer-employee rela-
tionship rather than a joint adventure. The decision is justified on the ground
that none of the parties by contract or agreement had a joint interest in the
undertaking from the beginning. The entire enterprise was operated and
controlled by one man, whose responsibility was contracted for. Among the
parties who were held to be employees there was no sense of responsibility for
the completion of their respective work, except to the general contractor. An
agreement between parties to produce entertainment for public presentation has
been called a joint adventure in many cases.-
The importance of applying the distinction between the single venture, to
use the business man's designation for an isolated business relation, and the
partnership is nowhere better illustrated than in a recent case where the court,
it would seem, could have decided the case by less circuitous and more realistic
reasoning if it had appreciated and applied the distinction. In Holmes v. Keets4
the plaintiff and the defendant entered into what they called a "partnership
agreement" for the operation of a particular hotel. For many years prior to
the agreement both parties had engaged separately in the business of renting
and operating improved property and the defendant had in fact operated an-
36. 41 F. 2d 230 (S.D. Cal. 1930).
37. 65 Cal. App. 463, 224 Pac. 263 (1924).
38. 251 N. Y. 402, 167 N. E. 514 (1929).
39. Senneff v. Healy, 155 Iowa 82, 135 N. W. 27 (1912); see Chapman v. Dvyer, 40
F. 2d 468, 471 (C. C. A. 2d 1930).
40. Miller v. Walser, 42 Nev. 497, 181 Pac. 437 (1919).
41. 195 Iowa 1386, 191 N. W. 884 (1923). See also, Hansen v. Bufford, 212 Cal. 100,
297 Pac. 908 (1931).
42. Losch v. Marcin, 251 N. Y. 402, 167 N. E. 514 (1929); Selvyn & Co. v. Waller,
212 N.Y. 507, 106 N.E. 321 (1914) ; cf. Thomas v. Springer, 134 App. Div. 640, 119 N.Y.
Supp. 460 (1st Dep't 1909).
43. 153 F. 2d 132 (App. D. C. 1946).
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other hotel adjacent to the one which was the subject of the so-called "partner-
ship agreement." Subsequent to the agreement the defendant built an annex
on his separately owned hotel doubling the capacity of that structure. The
plaintiff contended that this action by the defendant was in conflict with the
partnership agreement and sought to have the hotel annex declared a partner-
ship asset. The court reached the correct result in holding for the defendant,
but the court's reasoning seems questionable. The court reasoned that, since
at the time the so-called partnership agreement was made the defendant was
already a competitor, good faith did not restrain him from "making ordinary,
foreseeable improvements in his hotel business." Doubling the capacity of
defendant's hotel could hardly be dismissed as a mere "ordinary, foreseeable"
improvement. A more direct and legally defensible approach would have been
to recognize the agreement (despite what the parties in their apparent ignorance
of the law called it) for what it really was, namely, one creating a joint venture.
The parties by the very language of their agreement never intended to enter the
hotel business generally as the court did in fact point out. From all that ap-
pears, they never intended to become partners in the hotel business. As adverted
to earlier in this discussion, one of the characteristic incidents of the usual
joint venture is that each of the adventurers retains freedom of action to carry
on his separate livelihood. That is what distinguishes their separate venture
from one in which the parties intend to devote their entire time, efforts and
fortune to a general business for the purpose of earning a livelihood. The duty
of loyalty, common to both the partnership and the joint venture,44 has this
difference in its impact upon the former as distinguished from the latter: in
a partnership the fiduciary duty prevents any competition by a partner with
the partnership business; in the joint venture it is understood at the outset
that the individual business pursuits of the members are not thus to be re-
stricted by the mere union of the parties in an isolated venture. If the parties
were, as they incorrectly called themselves, partners, it is clear they could not
compete with the partnership. If, as would appear, they appreciated the limited
nature of their enterprise, their fiduciary duty not to compete would be
correspondingly circumscribed.
Legal Elements of a Joint Venture
Due to the fact that in the greater number of instances the law of joint
adventure and partnership parallel each other it may not appear to make any
difference whether the relation is designated a joint venture or a partnership.
This is understandable where the solution of a particular question remains
unaffected by the distinction between the two relationships. However, such
lack of discrimination, tends to confuse the two concepts when the difference
between them becomes important.
In order to investigate the legal consequences of the two concepts, let us
examine several points which are common to both. The relationship between
44. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 463, 464, 164 N. E. 545, 546 (1928). "Joint
adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, the duty
of the finest loyalty." Manefee v. Oxnam, 42 Cal. App. 81, 183 Pac. 379 (1919). See
Mechem, The Law of Joint Adventures, IS. MIN. L. REv. 644, n. 65 (1931).
[Vol. is
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joint adventurers like that existing between partners is, as we have just seen,
fiduciary in character; the parties owe each other the utmost good faith, honesty
and loyalty in their dealings with respect to all matters concerning the particular
enterprise and this requirement of good faith between the joint adventurers
and the agreement to divide the profits from the transaction forbid a co-
adventurer from acquiring and retaining for himself any secret advantage in
connection with the venture 4 5 In the absence of a contrary agreement joint
adventurers like partners share equally in the profits and losses arising from
their transactions. The benefits or profits arising out of the venture, prior to
the division, belong to the parties as a whole. As in the case of the partnership,
profit sharing appears to be an essential element of a joint adventure. 40 It is
that fact which most closely indicates the intention of the parties to be joint
associates in the transaction and joint proprietors of the venture so far as it
admits of proprietorship. The absence of a sharing in the profits would suggest
an employer-employee relationship 47 or some other relationship lacking a com-
munity of interest. Failure, however, to agree on a sharing of the losses would
not seem to preclude the formation of a joint adventure.8 Once an obligation
to share the losses has been established, however, the courts will apportion
them in the same ratio as the profits, unless the parties have agreed to the
contrary.49
45. Ibid.
46. Taylor v. Brindley, 164 F. 2d 235 (C. C. A. 10th 1947); Bowmaster v. Carroll, 23
F. 2d 825 (C. C. A. 8th 1928); Columbian Laundry v. Hencken, 203 App. Div. 140, 196
N. Y. Supp. 523 (1st Dep't 1922).
47. Tusant v. Weitz, 195 Iowa 1386, 191 N. W. 8M4 (1923); Thomas v. Springer, 134
App. Div. 640, 119 N. Y. Supp. 460 (1st Dep't 1909).
48. While some courts seem committed to the view that an agreement to share the loss
is essential to a partnerhip, Florence v. Fox, 193 Iowa 1174, 188 N. W1. 966 (1922), the
better view appears to be that parties may be partners (and by similar reasoning joint
adventurers) even though one agrees to bear all the losses. Mill Factors Corp. v. Margolies,
210 App. Div. 739, 206 N. Y. Supp. 434 (1st Dep't 1924); Orvis v. Curtiss, 157 N. Y.
657, 52 N. E. 690 (1899). Although the recent New York case of Bialostok v. A.-& Af.
Knitting Mis, 272 App. Div. 936, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 1, 2 (2d Dep't 1947) categorically stated:
"The relationship provided for is not a joint venture, since there was no agreement by plain-
tiff to share in the losses which might ensue," it should be noted that the cases cited therein
as authority for this proposition, namely Jasper v. Bernstein, 259 App. Div. 638, 20 N. Y.
S. 2d 362 (1st Dep't 1940); and Haxton & Son v. Rich, 267 App. Div. 492, 47 N. Y. S. 2d
501 (3d Dep't 1944), were cases in which the absence of an agreement to share in the losses
was only one of the elements considered in determining whether a joint venture existed.
Further, Marianni v. Summers, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 750, 754, aff'd, 269 App. Div. 840, 56 N. Y.
S. 2d 537 (Ist Dep't 1945), stated: "It is not indispensibly essential to the existence of a
joint venture that there be an agreement for the sharing of losses between the parties.... 11
Unlike an agreement to share the profits, which is the essential proof of that proprietorship
inherent in the partnership relation, the absence of an agreement that each party shall be
responsible for the losses does not completely negative proprietorship. (Of course such an
agreement operates merely inter se and is not binding on outsiders ignorant of the relation,
see note 54 infra).
49. This is the rule of presumed intent adopted by the Uniform Partnership Act, 7 U. L.
A. § 18, and it would seem that the courts will apply it by analogy to a joint venture.
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
It is not contended that sharing profits and losses is the sole test of a joint
adventure. In addition there must be the intention, either express or implied,
to operate the venture jointly, together with a joint proprietorship and control
in the venture.50 In this connection it would appear from the decided cases
that there is a substantial difference in the law as applied to joint adventurers
and partners. In the case of a partnership it was the prevalent view at common
law, codified in the Uniform Partnership Act,51 that a contribution of labor
was not a capital contribution in so far as it might constitute upon dissolution
and an offset accounting, an offset against a capital loss of a more tangible
nature. The result was that where one partner contributed nothing but services
and the other partner physical capital, and such capital became impaired, the
former was required to make good his proportionate share of the capital im-
pairment. This was the holding in the leading case of Whitcomb v. Converse."
In the opinion in that case Chief Justice Gray, however, appears to have made
a significant distinction: 53
"If, as is not infrequently the case in a partnership for a single adventure, the
mere use of the capital is contributed by one partner, and the partnership is in the
profits and losses only, the capital remains the property of the individual partner
to whom it originally belonged, any loss or destruction of it falls upon him as the
owner, and, as it never becomes the property of the partnership, the partnership owes
him nothing in consideration thereof. . . . But where, as is usual in an ordinary
mercantile partnership, a partnership is created not merely in profits and losses, but
in the property itself, the property is transferred from the original owners to the
partnership, and becomes the joint property of the latter; a corresponding obligation
arises on the part of the partnership to pay the value thereof to the individuals
who originally contributed it. .... "
When the court in the above quotation spoke of a "partnership for a single
adventure," it was apparently referring to the modern joint venture, and the
ditcum suggests the proposition that if one of the parties to a venture has
contributed only his skill, he is not liable to his co-adventurers for capital
financial losses which they may have suffered. 54
The joint adventure is accorded no recognition as an entity in the law for
any purpose. As a result it is impossible for it to take real property in a joint
50. Darling v. Buddy, 318 Mo. 784, 1 S. W. 2d 163 (1927) ; Glaser v. Medford-Marlboro
Knit Gaiter Co., 36 A. 2d 280 (N. H. 1944). But, as pointed out in U. S. Fidelity & Guar-
anty Co, v. Dawson Produce Co., 197 P. 2d 978 (Okla. 1948), the right of mutual control,
initially existing, can by agreement be placed wholly in the hands of one of the joint ad-
venturers or shared in any manner by them.
51. 7U.L.A.§ 18.
52. 119 Mass. 38 (1875).
53. Id. at 43.
54. Heran v. Hall, 40 Ky. 159 (1840). Note, however, that the fact of non-contribution
is not available against a creditor of the venture, nor against one who has been injured by
a co-adventurer in the conduct thereof, because as in the case of a partnership agreement
between the parties limiting liability cannot be effective against those who have no knowl-
edge thereof. Bond v. O'Donnell, 205 Iowa 902, 218 N. W. 898 (1928).
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artificial nameY5 The partnership at common law suffered from the same in-
firmity, but this has-been corrected by the Uniform Partnership Act which now
gives that partnership the right to hold property in its firm name.4o In many
jurisdictions so-called "common name" statutes permit, as a procedural con-
venience, suits by and against a partnership in its firm name.57 If such a statute
by its language is applicable solely to a partnership, it would seem that this
procedural form is not available to a joint venture.
The Internal Revenue Code leaves no opportuniy for distinguishing between
the partnership and joint adventure as to matters within its scope. In defining
a partnership, s the Code states that it includes a joint adventure. So for tax
purposes this statute treats the two concepts exactly alike.
Technically the Uniform Partnership Act does not apparently apply to joint
adventures. However, so many of the common law principles of partnership,
upon which the Act is based, apply to the joint adventure that the courts in
some instances interpret the concept according to the provisions of the Act.P9
It is not a blanket application of the Act but rather a piecemeal application.
This fragmentary employment of common law principles of the law of partner-
ship and of the statute tends to the confusion which justifies this present
discussion. At the present time there exists some joint venture law but it is
merely the improvisation of the courts, borrowed for the most part from the
law of partnerships. What the courts should do is recognize that the joint
venture is a relationship distinct in many respects from the partnership and
that it is to a great extent governed by general principles of the law of contracts,
fiduciaries, etc., not appropriate to the more stabilized partnership relation.
55. The use of a joint business name by a venture would in most cases be impractical
because it would not generally be worthwhile to set up and develop a trade name for one
transaction. As a result, property of the venture is often taken in the name of one of the
adventurers. Such property purchased with joint funds belongs to all the co-adventurers as
tenants in common. Under such circumstances the one holding the title becomes a trustee
for all. Austin v. Stephen, 89 Colo. 177, 300 Pac. 364 (1931). See also, Paganucci v. Kal-
pouzos, 178 P. 2d 62 (Cal. 1947).
56. 7 U. L. A. § 8 (3).
57. New York, surprisingly, was very tardy in enacting such legislation, N. Y. Cv.
PRAc. AcT § 222a (1945).
58. INT. RE"V. CODE § 3797 (a) (2) (1938).
59. Preston v. State Ind. Accident Comm'n, 174 Ore. 553, 149 P. 2d 957 (1944). At page
561, 149 P. 2d at 960, the court says, "The distinction between a partnership and a joint
adventure is of no importance in this case. . . . In the ensuing discussion we shall for
brevity employ the term 'partnership' as if inclusive of 'joint adventure'." The provision of
the Uniform Act applied by the court were those giving the definition of a partnership
(U,xroPR PARTm snHm AcT, 7 U. L. A. § 6) and those setting forth the tests for determin-
ing the existence of a partnership (UNiroaR PARi7,ERSmP Acr, 7 U.L.A. § 7). These sec-
tions are for the most part'a codification of the common law and, while reference to them
enabled the court better to articulate its reasoning, it would appear the court could have
reached the same result by applying the ordinary principles of contract and of agency.
1949]
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When Distinction is Important
There are instances when the distinction between the two concepts becomes
important and at these times it is imperative that the court discern the dif-
ferences and adjudicate the relationship accordingly. Loose judicial semantics
may lead to an injustice between the parties where a real difference between
the joint venture and the partnership exists.
There can be no real objection to a court's application of certain provisions
of the Uniform Partnership Act by analogy to a joint venture situation as an
aid to its solution of a problem. 60 Some sections of the Act would appear to
state the law applicable to a joint venture. This would seem to be true of the
section which furnishes tests for determining the existence of a partnership;0 1
the tests would appear to fit the joint venture as well. The provision of the
Act covering partnership by estoppel62 is based almost wholly on the law of
estoppel which might well, in part at least, apply to a joint venture. The rights
and duties of joint adventurers inter se would seem, in the absence of special
agreement, to be much the same as in the case of a partnership.03 Other
sections of the Uniform Act, especially those dealing with the authority of the
partners to act for, and bind, each other,64 may or not represent the law in
respect to joint ventures, depending upon the strictness or liberality of the
courts of the particular jurisdiction in interpreting the power of representation
of joint adventurers. 65
There are, nevertheless, certain extremely important sections of the Uniform
Act, in particular those dealing with partnership property, which, it is sub-
mitted, were never intended to apply to joint ventures. The Uniform Act
creates a novel relationship-the tenancy in partnershipOO-the incidents of
which the average joint adventurers cannot be presumed to have contemplated
or desired. The Act in practical, if not legal, effect treats the partnership as
a separate legal entity67 which is hardly what joint adventurers consider their
venture to be. It is at best doubtful that, as in the case of a partner, a joint
adventurer's undivided interest in specific property belonging to the venture
is neither assignable,08 nor subject to execution by his separate creditor 9 or
60. In Agar v. Orda, 264 N. Y. 248, 190 N. E. 479 (1934), in the face of a strong dis-
sent, the court applied a provision of the Uniform Sales Act to a case involving the sale of
stock certificates. This was done despite the fact that the provision had changed the
common law and that the Sales Act appeared expressly to limit its coverage to "chattels
personal other than things in action and money." After observing that certificates of stock
are today tangible objects of trade, the court, for the sake of uniformity, applied the pro-
visions of the Sales Act "by analogy."
61. UNIFORM PARTNERSHiP AcT, 7 U. L. A. § 7, see note 58 supra.
62. UNIFORM PARTNERSH P AcT, 7 U. L. A. § 16.
63. UNIFORM PARTNERSIP ACT, 7 U. L. A. §§ 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 31 and 32.
64. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, 7 U. L. A. §§ 9, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15.
65. See notes 59, 62 and 63 supra.
66. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, 7 U. L. A. §§ 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28.
67. See note 27 supra.
68. UNIFORM PARTNERSHiP AcT, 7 U. L. A. § 25 (2) (b).
69 UNIFORM PARTNERSaP AcT, 7 U. L. A. § 25 (2) (c).
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that upon his death it passes to the other joint adventurer or adventurers7 0
In determining the extent of the power of representation between the joint
adventurers it must be remembered that the relationship is entered into for
a very limited and closely defined transaction. Judicial opinion is uncertain
as to whether the law will imply the power of representation even within the
limits of the transaction. Some courts have held that such agency can only be
established between co-adventurers where it is based upon an express or implied-
in-fact authority between them,7 ' and the courts stress "action within a con-
templated sphere of endeavor" 72 or subsequent acquiescence."3 Application to
co-adventurers of the broad rules of mutual agency between partners would
lead to positive inequities, and yet it has been stated without qualification
that the adventurers have power to bind each other.7 4 Perhaps the true solution
lies somewhere between the denial of any but actual authority and the recog-
nition of full authoriy implied by law. It may be that the difference between
the power of representation in the partnership and that in the joint venture
is one of degree and not of kind, and that, the scope of the joint venture being
limited, the authority of the adventurers to bind each other is correspondingly
restricted. Partners are general agents of each other because the partnership
is engaged in a general business. Joint adventurers are special agents of each
other because their common activity is of a special, and not a general nature73
70. U,-ropt PA TNERsi, AcT, 7 U. L. A. § 25 (2) (d).
71. Keyes v. Mims, 43 Cal. App. 1, 184 Fac. 695 (1919). In Jones v. Gould, 209 N. Y.
419, 426, 103 N. E. 720, 722 (1913), the court stated: "The authorities in some of the states
hold that in the prosecution of the venture each party has the same full power to bind his
associates in any contract in regard to the venture that an ordinary commercial partner
would have. We are not now inclined to hold that doctrine in its full integrity .... " The
power of representation in this case was justified on the ground of expressly conferred
authority. Also see Wrenn v. Moskin, 226 App. Div. 563, 235 N. Y. Supp. 405 (Ist Dep't
1929). In Dolan v. Dolan, 107 Conn. 342, 349, 140 Atl. 745, 74S (1928) it was stated:
"There is not the relation of principal and agent in joint adventure which we find in a
partnership." The recent case of Haddard v. Western Contracting Corp., 71 F. Supp. 212
(N. D. W. Va. 1946), however, expanded the power of a joint adventurer to bind his associ-
ates by contracts reasonably necessary to carry on the venture with respect to matters in
which he has express or apparent authority. It should be noted that, "when third parties
deal with a joint adventurer in good faith and without knowledge of any limitation on his
authority, the law presumes him to have the power to bind his associates by such con-
tracts as are reasonably necessary to carry on the business in which the joint adventurers
are engaged. And they become liable upon such contracts, although they have expressly
agreed between themselves that they should not." Taylor v. Brindley, 164 F. 2d 235, 241
(C. C. A. 10th 1947).
72. Bond v. O'Donnell, 205 Iowa 902, 218 N. W. 898 (1928). It was said in State v.
Bland, 197 S. W. 2d 669 (Mo. 1946), that each member of a joint adventure is responsible
for the negligent acts of the other if within the scope and object of the joint undertaking.
73. Dingle v. Camp, 121 Wash. 393, 209 Pac. 853 (1922).
74. Hartman v. Day, 249 App. Div. 786, 292 N. Y. Supp. 226 (2d Dep't 1936). Chis-
holm v. Gilmer, 81 F. 2d 120 (C. C. A. 4th 1936), aff'd, 299 U. S. 99 (1936); State ex rel
Crane Co. v. Stokke, 65 S. D. 207, 272 N. W. 811 (1937).
75. RESTATEMrNT, AGENcY § 3 (1933). It is upon a theory of lack of full and general
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
Some courts have volunteered the information that the main distinction
between partners and co-adventurers is that the latter may sue each other at
law while the former are restricted to suits in equity.7 The broadness of such
a statement is uncalled for and is misleading. Courts have permitted co-
adventurers to sue each other at law for a share of the profits 7 while such
mutual agency in the joint venture relationship that the courts permit corporations to be-
come co-adventurers, Clinchfield Fuel Co. v. Henderson Iron Works Co., 254 Fed. 411
(C. C. A. 5th 1918), while denying them the power to become members of a partnership
Mallory v. Hananer Oil-Works, 86 Tenn. 598, 8 S. W. 396 (1888). However, since the dis-
tinction between the power of representation in the two relations is principally a matter of
degree, it would seem that the joint venture concept has merely furnished the courts
with a means of holding intra vires a transaction which by precedent would be condemned
as ultra vires. See STEVENS, CORPORaMONS § 58 (1936). In Luhrig Collieries Co. v. Inter-
state Coal & Dock Co., 281 Fed. 265, 274 (S. D. N. Y. 1922) Hand, J., held a contract to
be intra vires by designating it as one creating a joint venture. He was frank to admit,
however, that: "It is perhaps true that the agreement at bar would have created a partner-
ship, if made by individuals; yet it is strange that, so far as I have found, no such con-
tract to which a corporation was a party has been held invalid on the ground that a part-
nership was intended. The question, certainly as between the parties, being entirely one of
intent, the proper rule seems to me to be that parties should not be presumed to intend to
create a partnership by a joint venture, when one is a corporation."
The shadowy dividing line between the partnership and the joint venture and consequently
between the authority or lack of authority of a corporation to enter into a particular ar-
rangement is illustrated by the very recent division among the justices of the Appellate
Division, First Department in Red Robin Stores, Inc. v. Rose, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 685 (1st
Dep't 1948). In that case the plaintiff corporation and the defendant entered into agree-
ments of five years duration, with an option to renew for an additional five years, purport-
ing to set up a joint venture in the operation of the ladies ready-to-wear departments
of plaintiff's chain of ladies wearing apparel retail stores. The agreements provided that the
defendant was to be the general executive in full administrative control of merchandising
the joint venture, devoting his full time thereto, all major decisions of policy and of long
term commitments or other matters affecting the joint venture beyond administrative or
operational matters to be decided by the mutual agreement of the defendant and the
chief executive officer of the plaintiff. The plaintiff after the "joint venture" was in opera-
tion for four years brought an action for a judgment declaring the agreement Illegal.
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and Special Term denied the motion. The
Appellate Division, by a three to two decision, reversed and dismissed the complaint. Tile
majority held that the agreements themselves did not disclose that the relationship was one
other than stated in the agreements, namely, a joint venture, and that to obtain a decision
to the effect that there actually existed a partnership, facts, as distinct from legal
conclusions, must be alleged. The majority's conclusion on the relationship resulting
from the agreements is weakened somewhat as an authority because the majority held that
the plaintiff was seeking a ruling on a mere abstract question of law without informing the
court factually of the nature of the dispute and that the action for a declaratory judgment
might not be used for that purpose.
76. Miller v. Walser, 42 Nev. 497, 513, 181 Pac. 437, 442 (1919). The court said: "The
principal distinction between a partnership and joint adventure is that, in most jurisdictions,
where any is regarded as existing, one party may sue the other at law for a breach of the
contract; but this right will not preclude a suit in equity for an accounting."
77. Felbel v. Kahn, 29 App. Div. 270, 51 N.Y. Supp. 435 (1st Dep't 1898).
[Vol. 18
1949] COMMENTS
questions between partners must be determined in equity in accounting pro-
ceedings. However, the reason why co-adventurers have been given relief at
law is because their transaction has usually been a single one and when it is
completed, their financial status is readily discernable.78 It would seem, ac-
cordingly, that in the case of the joint venture it is the facility of the determi-
nation which induces the courts of law to give relief rather than any essential
difference between the relationships.7" There are many instances where the
subject of the venture is not a simple financial transaction but one requiring
an accounting to determine the rights of the parties.80 In these cases equitable
relief is properly given.8 ' It remains generally true, however, that co-adventurers
may sue at law for damages if one has wronged the other even with respect
to their venture8 2 Such a controversy between partners would require an
accounting to determine the damages,83 because until a balance is struck it
cannot be determined whether damages should be paid.
78. "a joint adventure is very frequently an undertaking of a very limited scope in
which the finances are practically in a state of liquidation at all times... "M echem, The
Law of Joint Adventures, 15 Mum. L. REv. 644, 646 (1931).
79. In the recently decided case of Kalmanash v. Weinstein, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 89, 90 (Sup.
Ct. 1946), where an attorney brought suit at law against two other attorneys for a share of
fees, the court said: "Giving the complaint the most favorable construction, it appears there-
from that plaintiff's claim is for one-third of the sum of $150,OOD alleged to have been
collected by the defendants as fees in two stockholders' suits. Even assuming that plaintiff
has alleged a joint venture, it would appear that the same has been dosed and that the
amount alleged to have been earned by the defendants as fees has been paid. As plaintiff
seeks one-third of the sum so paid, the amount of his claim is readily ascertainable by mere
-computation and there is therefore no need for equitable relief by way of an accounting'
80. McKee v. Capitol Dairies, Inc., 164 Ore. 1, 99 P. 2d 1013 (1940).
81. Marston v. Gould, 69 N. Y. 220 (1877); Stitzer v. Fonder, 214 Pa. 117, 63 At.
421 (1906).
82. Elledge v. Hotchkiss, 222 Ala. 129, 130 So. 893 (1930); Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58
Cal. App. 354, 136 P. 2d 651 (1943).
83. Dalury v. Rezinas, 183 App. Div. 456, 170 N. Y. Supp. 1045 (Ist Dep't 1918),
4ff'd, 229 N. Y. 513, 129 N. E. 896 (1920). The confused state of the law, which has
resulted from a failure to appreciate the basis for granting or denying a joint adventurer
relief at law, is illustrated in the dictum found in a recently decided case, Leitner v. Wass,
63 N. Y. S. 2d 350, 352 (Sup. Ct. 1946), where the court held that an antenuptial agree-
ment, and not a joint venture, existed between the parties. The court then said: "More-
over, assuming it [the agreement] creates and constitutes a joint business venture, it would
establish a partnership relation between the parties and 'The rule is well settled that neither
joint adventurers nor partners can sue each other at law for anything relating to the con-
cerns of the joint enterprise' until after a settlement and balance struck and express promise
to pay, ie., 'only after there has been an account stated between them.'" The rule quoted by
the court is announced in Langford v. Delalle, 136 Misc. 62, 63, 239 N. Y. Supp. 107, 109
(Sup. Ct. 1930) which in turn relies upon Arnold v. Arnold, 90 N. Y. 580 (1882) which
involved a partnership and not a joint venture, and Turner v. Weston, 133 N. Y. 650, 31 N.
E. 91 (1892) which does not seem to have involved the question of a joint adventurer's
right to sue at law. The other decision cited by the first mentioned court is Consolidated
Machinery & Wrecking Co. v. Harper Machinery Co., 190 App. Div. 283, 180 N. Y. Supp.
135 (1st Dep't 1920), wherein, it is true, the majority of the court held that a joint ad-
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
The question arises whether the Bankruptcy Act recognizes any difference
between the two concepts or treats them in the same manner as the Internal
Revenue Code. Section 1 of the Bankruptcy Act defines a "person" as including
a partnership 4 which may be adjudged bankrupt aside and apart from the
partners.8 5 Nowhere in the Bankruptcy Act can we find any authority for
further enlarging the scope of a partnership so as to include a joint adventure
nor do the courts appear to be willing to do so. s° Section 22(a)87 provides
that any person may become a voluntary bankrupt. This section has been
interpreted to include a partnership but not an unincorporated association.8 8
The unincorporated association is, however, included in Section 22 (b) which
sets forth those individuals and relationships which may be adjudged an in-
voluntary bankrupt. It is the opinion of Professor Mechem that the joint
adventure is provided for under the Act in Section 22 (b) as an unincorporated
association. 9 If this view is correct, then a joint adventure, not being included
within the concept of partnership, is not entitled to become a voluntary bank-
rupt but may, however, be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt as an unincorpo-
rated association. This would result in a situation which would seem to require
recognition and correction by Congress. A joint venture is not a business entity
(but a purely contractual relationship) which should not be the subject of a
bankruptcy adjudication any more than any other joint contractual relation.
The determination of the expiration date of a joint adventure is relatively
simple because it is usually ascertainable in point of event, if not in point
of time, at the outset of the venture. The normal partnership agreement is
not ordinarily entered into with any specific ideas concerning its termination.
Upon the completion of the particular enterprise constituting the venture the
relationship ceases. In a partnership the death of a partner causes a dissolution
of the relation, but that is not true in the case of the death of one of the
venturer could not maintain an action at law until after an accounting and an express promise
to pay the balance. However, the last case cited seems to be subject to criticism, because the
transaction between the parties in that case seems to have been comparatively simple (the
purchase, erection and sale of two cranes) and the necessity for any accounting very slight,
consisting merely in the ascertainment of certain expenditures which the defendants claimed
they had made, a question of fact which may arise in any action at law on a contract.
84. 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 23 (a,k) (Supp. 1946).
85. Tatum v. Acadian Production Corporation of Louisiana, 35 F. Supp. 40 (E. D. La.
1940).
86. Id. at 45. "The term 'partnership' is no more specifically defined by the Bankruptcy
Act of 1938 than it was by the Act of 1898, and, as a general rule, reference must be had
to state laws and judicial decisions on partnership law, in any given case, to determine the
question whether a partnership exists or not."
87. 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 22 (a) (Supp. 1946).
88. In re Manufacturing Lumbermen's Underwriters, 18 F. Supp. 114 (W. D. Mo.
1936).
89. Mechem, The Law of Joint Adventures, 15 MirN. L. REv. 644, 655 (1931). It
would seem, however, that a joint venture is further removed from an unincorporated as-
sociation than it is from a partnership and that if it is not included in the provision per-
taining to partnerships it is a fortiori not covered by Section 22 (b).
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co-adventurers, 90 unless, of course, it is a personal service contract. The venture
being for a definite time or purpose is not dissolved until that time has passed
or the purpose has been accomplished. So also the transfer by one of the co-
adventurers of his interest in the venture to a third party should not necessarily
be the cause of an automatic dissolution.91 When such a transfer is permitted
by the courts it is apparently because of the absence in the joint adventure
of the element of delectus personarwm to the full degree to which that element
is required in the case of a partnership 2 Due to the limited scope and tem-
porary nature of the joint venture relation the personal qualities and compata-
bility of the adventurers, vital in an undertaking of permanence and confidence,
is not such as would be considered essential in a relationship as opportunistic
as the joint venture. The joint adventure is less effected by events which
might affect the personal relationships of the parties because personalities play
a less important part, it being a temporary liaison. The parties to the venture
have in mind merely the completion of the venture and the profit to be derived
from it. Theirs is not a business marriage as is the partnership but more of
an arms-length transaction. When the courts recognize this fact they reach
the correct result.
Conclusion
At the present time there is a rising need in the commercial and professional
world for a recognized legal relation of the type of a joint adventure. We
have little independent law for the joint adventure as such. The law of partner-
ship is applied to most ventures and legal grease has been added to this pro-
cedure by the courts through their statements that a joint adventure and a
partnership are the same. Possibly in the future the courts will be more ready
to admit of the independent existence of the joint venture concept, even though
it means no more than giving particular application to the ordinary principles
of the general law of contracts. Professor Mechem prefaces his article on the
90. Pfingstl v. Solomon, 240 Ala. 58, 197 So. 12 (1940) ; Pounall v. Cearfoss, 40 S. E.
2d 886 (W. Va. 1946); but see, in re Scotts Will, 204 N. Y. Supp. 478, 496 (Surr. CL 1924)
wherein the court stated that on the death of one joint adventurer it is the duty of the
other members to wind up the affairs of the joint venture. But cf., Silberfeld v. Swiss Bank
Corp., 273 App. Div. 686, 79 N.Y. S. 2d 380 (1st Dep't 1948), where the death of a
partner terminated a partnership and was also held to terminate a joint venture to which the
partnership was a party.
91. Kaufman v. Catzen, 100 W. Va. 79, 130 S. E. 292 (1925); Brady v. Erlanger, 16S
App. Div. 29, 149 N. Y. Supp. 929 (1st Dep't 1914).
92. But see Terminal Shares v. Chicago B. & 0. R.R., 65 F. Supp. 678, 6S1 (E. D. Mo.
1946), where the court said: "An interest in a joint adventure cannot, as such, be transferred
without the consent of the owner of the remaining interest, any more than one partner
can substitute a stranger in its place in the partnership without the consent of the owner of
the remaining interest." See also, Grosberg, Joint Adventure-Ex ent to Wlich Partnership
Law Applies, 35 rcir. L. R v. 297, 305 (1936). However, since the element of delecltus
personarunm is not present in a joint venture to the full extent that it is in a partnership, it
is difficult to perceive why a joint adventurer must obtain the consent of his fellow adven-
turers before he can transfer his interest in the venture.
1949]
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joint venture with the following statement: "At the present time this new-
comer is clamoring, and not without success, for recognition as a legal relation-
ship sui generis."9 3 This concept has individuality and there is a place for it
in the commercial and professional world. For that reason the law should give
it individual recognition and not categorize it as the poor relation of the
partnership.
93. Mechem, The Law of Joint Adventures, 15 MINN. L. REv. 644 (1931).
